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FOREWORD 
Contributions to t h e  .MetropoZitan Study:3 
The Project "Nested Dynamics of Metropolitan Processes 
and Policies" was initiated by the Regional & Urban Development 
Group in 1982, and the work on this collaborative study started 
in 1983. The series of contributions to the study is a means 
of conveying information between the collaborators in the net- 
work of the project. 
This paper by Paul Lesse deals with the relationship 
between dynamic economic changes at the microlevel and equili- 
brium descriptions applicable at the macrolevel. In this way 
the present contribution focuses on one of the basic theoretical 
issues in the Metropolitan Study: the possibility of relating 
effects observed on the aggregate level to the actions of 
people and economic agents whose individual decisions produce 
these effects. Thereby it also relates to the problem' of mul- 
tiple dynamic changes at the disaggregated level and the 
resulting static equilibrium at the global level. 
The outcome of the approach is an aggregate equilibrium 
statistical representation in the form of an entropy maximizing 
probability distribution based on characteristics of the dynamic 
equations. The approach also makes it possible to relate entropy 
maximizing models to behavioral models based on cost minimizing 
or utility maximizing assumptions with reference to logit and 
probit types of models. 
BBrj e Johansson 
Acting Leader 
Regional & Urban Development Group 
I IASA 




2. EQUILIBRIUM STP-TISTICAL REPRESENTATION OF 
LARGE DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 
3. SOME OTHER DYNAMIC SYSTEMS AND THEIR 





THE STATISTICAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
P.F. Lesse 
Division of Building Research, 
Highett, Victoria, Australia 
Motto: 
"One interested only in fruitful statics must study dynamics" 
P.A. Saxnuelson: Foundations of Economic Analysis 
SUMMARY 
The paper deals with the following problems: 
- relationship between the dynamic changes observed in an 
economic system at the disaggregated level and, equilibrium 
description applicable at the aggregated scale. 
- relationship between entropy maximizing models and behavioral 
.(cost minimizing, utility maximizing) models. 
- the answers are provided in terms of an entropy maximizing 
probability distribution based on topological characteristics 
of the dynamic equations (Lyapunov functions) . 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
There e x i s t s  a cur~s iderubl t !  body of l i t e r a t u r e  d e a l i r ~ g  uitf.1 socio- 
economic and u b a n  planning models u i n q  entropy as a s u i t a b l e  concept 
~ r ~ a  Juyr~es '  ( 1?57a,L) pr.irlciple as  t hurldy tucl f o r  o L C c i r ~ i r ~ y  t h e  values 
uf vari&ies et an ecgregeted level. Ecst of these -msers can be tmtsd 
. .. 
' tack ta iiilso:~ (1966, 197C:. 1374, arlu pcueL.s cited i n  t11e [rlur~oorrsiis; 
uho has shown that the empirical qavity model cen be derived by 
entropy ~naxin~izatiorl. Appl icatiorr of this appr-ouch led to a larqe 
number of planning models, many of uhich have been widely used in 
practice. The entrouy rr~ethod is thus t1ieor.et;ically sourrd ard successful 
in practice; nevertheless, there appear to be a few aspects of it which 
are felt to be in rreed of further. developrnerrt. 
One such aspect is the relationship between the effects observed on the 
aggregated level and the attiorrs of people whose irdividual decisiorls 
produce these effects. Another is the problem of the relationship 
betveer) the mu1 tiple dyrreunic changes at the disggr-egated (micro 1 level 
and the resulting static equilibrium at the global level. 
Bath these problems have beer1 ,identified by numerous wr.iter.s and treated 
from different angles. The former problem can be seen as a problem of 
aggregation; the latter us ei search for a =elationship between 
descriptive and causative or behavioural models. In this sense, it can 
also be interpreted formlly as the problem of relating the models bsed 
on maximizetion of entropy with those hsed on utility. 
Utility is generally accepted as a behavioural concept well defined in 
'terms of individual preferences over the set of socio-economic states 
(Papageoqiou, 1977 1 . The pr-ublern of aggregtltion of the ir~dividual 
utility functions and the reletion between the entropy and utility-based 
rnodels is rather conrplicaCed and has beer1 reviewed by Wilsun (1975). An 
aggregated utility function wes, in many cases, derived by the theory of 
random utility (fur analysis, see Herrski, 1977) whose relation to tlie 
entrupy-ksed models ues pointed out by EcFedden (1974) and Cochrane 
(19751. Tkle r.elaliurlsi~ip Letueer~ erllrupy s~cxin~izirrq rsodels arrd r.srldorn 
utility ksed models was expiained by Anas (i9821. Among those uho have 
rluntr.ivia1 reservations about the erltrupy ~naxirnizirlg technique, and ut~u 
demand that a link connecting the behavioural erd descriptive mcdels 
should be estblished, belurlgs T. Smith (19781. T. Smith formulated an 
alternative theory ksed on the observation that the hiqh cost trips are 
in general less pr.oWle than thuse with lower cost (cust efficiency 
principle). In a similar spirit entropy has been treated as a measure 
of accessibility Ly EL-larder (1977, 19801. Boyce arrd Jansen (1980) see 
entropy es a concept related to spatial interaction among traffic flows 
arld used as u srnuoting device (19811. The various aggregated f o m  of 
utility or consumer benefit were studied by William (1976, 1977). 
W i l i m  clnd Senior (19771 have studied the appr.opriate rneclsure of the 
consumer benefit in the field of locational analysis. The dual 
relatiors between rnodels Lased on various utility-like furlctions and 
those maximizing entropy were explored by Wilson and Senior (1974) and 
Coelho urd Wilson (19771. The cumrrlon feature of these papers is the 
derivation of an aggregate measure of benefit (usually related to 
inciividual preferences) which attairis its maxirnuni 'at certain values of 
parameters describing the state of the system. Identical values are 
then shorn to be obtained by meximizirlg entropy subject to certain 
constraints. 
The derivation of the aggregate utilities is in general static, i.e. the 
8 
dynamic nature of the decision m k i y  process is seldom tackled. 
Recently Bertuglia and Leorlardi (19791 have published a dynamic model 
bsed on the theory of Harkov processes. Wilson (19781 suggested using 
the theory of optinlur~r contr.01 for. this pur.pse and briefly outlined c 
uey how such e result could be achieved. 
In this paper I propose a theory cap&le of at least partly explaining 
the relationship between the utility meximiziny or. cost minimizing 
dynamics observed a t  the micro economic level, and the static entropy 
r~~axirnizir~g rr~odels describing the aggregate behaviour.. The theory is 
based on e new approach to larqe dynamic models of socio-economic 
systems (e.g. Isad arid Anselin, 1960: Kohr~o, Yoshidu, H i  tomo, 1981 : 
Kohno , Higano , 1982 1 . 
The method is hsed or1 a very simple idea: 
The equations describing the dynamics of a complicated economic systems 
corrtairi two kirrds of inforn~aCion: (i 1 'ephemeral ' information which 
affects the system's behaviour only for a short time (ii) 'essential' 
or important information uhich qualitatively determines the behaviour of 
the system. 
Thk fonaer is of little irspor-tarice to the behaviou of the system as a 
whole and can be expected to be 'aggreqated out' in a corresponding 
mcro nrodel. The latter determines the system's overall behaviour and 
is to be retained in the macro description. The aggrwated model is 
thus a picture of reality which cancels out the epherneral.changes 
observed at the micro.leve1 ard retains the results of the essential 
changes. 
Hathematically, the epherr~er-a1 infomtion in many ceses includes the 
initial conditions: the essential comprises topological characteristics 
of solutions such es Lyapuriov furrctionv und constants of motion. 
We shall distinguish three ksic aescriptions of a dynamic system: 
1 > The ordir~ary ay rla~ric descriptiur~ of t11e syster~~'s Leliaviour- which is 
obiairled Ly solvirlq the dyrleunic equatiur~v for a particular set of. 
initial conditions and hence does not distinguish between the 
ephen~eral and essential. This category alsu comprises the models 
uf optimal growth using the theory of optimal control, differential 
games, etc. 
The statistical descr.iption which uses the esser~tial infonnation 
for construction of a probability distribution. The prohbility 
distribution is defined in a spce of the systenl's variables and 
regards the nonessential information as a random influence. 
3) The macro (aggregated, or pher~on~er~ologicall description in terms of 
quantities which are averages and higher momenta of the 
rnicrovariabl es. The averaging process uses the prohbi lity 
distribution provided by the statistical description to suppress 
the eghee~eral infanriation and to highlight the essential. An 
outline of this approach has been given elsewhere (Lesse, 1982). 
In the follouinq I shall construct the statistical descriptions 
corresponding to several classes of dynamic models. 
2. EQUILIBRIUH STATISTICAL REPRESENTATION OF LARGE DYNAHIC SYSTEMS 
2.1 A feu remarks on stability and boundedness of differential 
equations 
The foilowiry e1ernerlta.y facts car1 be found e.g.  in Hirsch and Smale 
(1979) or Varian (19811. 
Rer11ac.k 2 . 1 .  CunsiLier- a suciu-ecor!o~~~ic systeoi which can be n~odelled by a 
set of integrebie differentiel equetions 
This system is s t a b l e  a t  t h e  o r i g i n  x = 0 i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a p o s i t i v e  
d e f i n i t e  f u r ~ c t i o r ~  V ( 1 (Lyapurlov furlctiorrl: 0 + R uhich is 
nanincreas ing  a l o n g  t h e  p a t h s  gene ra t ed  by (11 ,  i . e .  uh ich  h a s  t h e  
proper ty  
If  -V is rlegative def  i r ~ i t e  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of the o r i g i n  is a s y ~ n p t o t i c .  
By removing t h e  cond i t ion  f(O1 = 0 i n  (2.11 we o b t a i n  a more gene ra l  
dyrltunic system wi th  t h e  e q u i l i l r i u n ~  p o i n t  riot n e c e s s a r i l y  a t  the o r i q i n .  
In such a system t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  a Lyapunov f u n c t i o n  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  
so lu t io r l s  m e  u n i f o r n ~ l y  bounded, i . e .  f o r  any a > 0 t h e r e  e x i s t s  a 
cons tan t  B > 0 such t h a t  ixol L a impl ies  t h a t  the s o l u t i o n s  of (2.11 
a r e  bounded: I x ( t ,  t o ,  xolI  < B f o r  a l l  t > to. 
Remark 2.2 
I f  t h e  system (2.11 is l i n e a r  t h e  Lyapurlov func t ion  is a p o s i t i v e  
d e f i n i t e  quadratic form V = xT Hx with nxrl matr ix H which is a s o l u t i o n  
of a matr ix  equa t ion  
where G is any nxn s ~ m m e t r i c  p o s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e  mat r ix  and A is t h e  
o p e r a t o r  d e f i n i n g  t h e  l i n e a r  system: 
k = Ax, x ( 0 )  = x  . 
0 
The e x i s t e r ~ c e  of t h e  p o s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e  r r~a t r ix  H s e t i s f y i r q  ( 2 . 3 )  is l o t h  
s u f f i c i e n t  and necessary  f o r  t h e  a sympto t i c  s t a b i l i t y  of  ( 2 . 4 )  ( S i l j d ,  
1978) .  
Remark 2 .3  
0 being  cornpact. V :  0 + R is bounded, i . e .  t h e r e  is a constar i t  t! such  
t h a t  V(x) S n, Vx E 0 
2.2 The p r . u W i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o r ~ s  a s s o c i a t e d  u i t h  dynamic sys tems  
D e f i n i t i o n  2.1: 
The p r o b h i l i t y  t h a t  EL d i f f e r e n t i a l  r~eighbourhood of an u r h i t r a r y  p o i n t  
xa E 0, i .e .  t h e  i n t e r v a l  Exa, xa + d x l ,  c o r ~ t a i n s  a s o l u t i o n  of t h e  
system (1) i r r e s p e c t i v e  of i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  is 
P ( x )  = exp CQ - X V ( x ) l  
where Q = - l og  1 exp C -  X V(x) l  dx  
x 0 
and X s a t i s f i e s  
We observe  t h a t  t h e  p r -ohb i  1  iCy d i s t r - i l u t i o n  ( 2.5 1 nraximizes Shanrlor~ 
en t ropy  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  usua l  n o m a l i z a t i o n  c o n d l i l o n  and t o  ( 2 . 7 ) .  The 
v l r . lue  of Sllarirlor~ er~Lr.upy es e pr .uoJbi ; i ty  es t in~cl tor  r e s t s  on t h e  v e i l  
known argments of Jaynes (1957a,b). 
Definition 2.1 has the follouir~g significance: If the system (2.1) is 
too large and/or if the initial conditions are not known and therefore 
if the solutior~ car~rlot be obtair~ed, Definitior~ 2.1 pves the way t u z  
statistical description of the dynamic system. This description is tin2 
indepedent , Cherefore it [nay be called the equi 1 ibriun statistical 
remesentation (ESR) of the dynamic system. The notion of equilibrium 
whose rriear~ing has after1 Leer1 discussed in ecor~omic literature in the 
past (e.g. Samuelson, 1948: Hicks, 19391, and at present (Andersson and 
Persson, 1980: Erlander., 1962) is Chus given a neu, and I believe a more 
precise meaning: An equilibrium is that statistical description of a 
dyrwnic (micro) econornic systerl~ which is h e d  on the knowledge of ' 
Lyapunov function(s1 only. This definition generalizes that used in 
physics (Katz, 1967). In addition the definition resolves the old arid 
vexing question whether an economic system at a particular time is, or 
can be, at equilibrium. The ansuer is UiaC no system can 'be at 
equilibrium' in this sense es equilibrium is not a property of the 
system but refers to a giver] description which in turn depends on the 
state of our knowledge. Houever, it is legitimate to ask when the 
equilibrium description of a system is adequate for a given purpose. 
This question in effect tests the reliability of the ESR and therefore 
iC is important both from Che philosophical and practical point of view. 
2.3 RelieSility of ESR 
ESR is based or1 the ~naxin~ization of eritropy and herice any investigation 
of reliihility should start with the eppraisal of this method for 
asslgr~ir~g pr-oklilities. Huvever., so r~~uch as beer1 uritter~ on :his 
s u b j e c t  i n  r e c e n t  years  t h a t  only a  quo ta t ion  should be s u f f i c i e n t :  
"The P r i n c i p l e  of Naxirnu~n Entr-opy, l i k e  Ockhanl, C e l l s  us t o  r e f r a i n  fr.ore 
invent ing  Urn Models when we have no Urn" (Jaynes ,  1978). The reader  
who h a s  r e s e r v a t i o r ~ s  concernirlq t h e  method is r-eferred t o  t h e  excellerrt  
expos i t ion  from which t h e  quo ta t ion  has  been taken.  Al te rna t ive ly ,  
those  with a l l e r y i e s  tuua rds  physica l  scierlces can corlsult  the  
monographs by Wilson (19701, (1974) o r  Webber (19801 on t h i s  sub jec t .  
I f  t h e  maxin~ization of eriCr.upy is accepted as a  v a l i d  laethod f o r  
e s t ima t ion  o r  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  we can seek answers t o  t h e  two ques t ions  
which detenlline t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of E S R :  
1) what is t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of E S R ,  i . e .  what kind of information does 
ESR provide? 
2 )  how car1 t h i s  information be v e r i f i e d  by data?  
I  s h a l l  dea l  with these  ques t ions  i n  more d e t a i l  now. 
Infornlation DL-ovided by ESR 
ESR is a  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i o r ~  of t h e  sys ten~  obtained by 
d i s rega rd ing  t h e  nonessential  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  dynamics. A s  a 
consequence it models t h e  system fr-on1 a  solnewhat detached po in t  of view, 
making it poss ib le  t o  omit t h e  micro l e v e l  d e t a i l s  of t h e  dynamic 
changes which do not a f f e c t  t h e  o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e  of t h e  system. This  
o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e  is obtained by using t h e  expected (average) va lues  of 
t h e  ve r iub les  considered a s  i n t e r e s t i n g  o r  important.  
A simple example can serve a s  an  i l l u s t m t i o n .  
Consider a %muelson (19471 dynamic model of competitive market given by 
the equations 
dp 1- 
d t - ki fi(pi . . . i=l, . . . ri, 
where is the price, fi (pl, . . . pri the excess and ki the 
price adjustment coefficient of the i-th commodity. Following the usual 
li~ie~izatiorl procedu.e (Sil jak, 1978) (2.81 car) be Lransf ormed into 
. - 
where p = p - p* is Che excess uf the pr-ice vector p over the 
equilibrium price p*, and A is a stable Metzler nxn ~ t r i x .  
It can be seen that (2.9) is a special case of (2.41. If p(O) is not 
known the classical analysis does offer very little beyond the 
detenr~ination of the equililr.ium pr-ice p* towards which the system, 
tends. 
In contrast, the statistical approach rrtakes it possible to determine the 
positive definite matrix H from (2.3) and also the corresponding ESR 
which has the form: 
A AT h P(p) = exp CQ - p X H PI. 
The multiplier X can be determined using (2.7) if there is a suitable @ 
h 
and if sup iT ti p = fl car, be fourd. 
PcQ 
LSE mkes 1 L posuille to ansum U I ~  follouirlg type of quesiioris: 
1) If prices are confined to a subspace 0, what is the expected 
h 
average deviation of price from the equilibrium price, <p>? 
The answer is, of course 
h h h h  
<p = P(p) p dp 
P 0 
h h 
21 How much does p deviate fr.tinl <p>? The deviaLiori is n~easured by . 
the variance 
I\ 
"T ' T 
var Ip) - <p p > - <3<p> , 
" ^T '. A 
where <p p > = / P(p) p p dp 
D @ 
We cen make the following olservatioris: 
ESR of a stable linear dynamic system is s normal (Gaussian) 
prohbility distribution with zero mean and a variance matrix Q 
determined by the Lyapunov function H and by the Lagrange 
mu1 tiplier A (Q-I = AH). Conversely, equilibrium probit models can 
be viewed as ESR's generated by stable dynamic linear systems 
describing the changes at the rnicro level. 
Using equation ( 2 . 3 )  it is possible to find a number of Lyapunov 
matrices H corr.esporrding to a given dynm~ic operator. A and 
generated by various G. Obviously, those H leading to sharper 
prolability distributions are to be preferred. It is possible to 
formulate a problem of finding the optimum Lycpunuv function unich 
yields a pr.o&ility distr.ilutiori (2 .10 )  with v a r i e r ~ c e  it1 soilis 
sense minimal. 
31 For a given H the definition of the feasible doleain .Q, detennirles 
the upper bound H and, finally I. It can be seen that the smeller 
,H the sharper the pr.okbility ciisCributiort will Le. This is ir~ 
agreement with conlrnon sense, of course, as tl in general decreases 
with decreasing size of the feasible do111air1 which in t u n  r-eflects 
a more constrained (i.e. more predictable) behaviour of the system. 
4 )  The muunC of infur.~eation pruvided Ly ESR car1 Le 1neasu.sd by 
inserting the prohbility distribution into the definition of 
Shannon entropy. 
The result is an estimate 
n A 
with Q = - logdo exp C- fiT I H p l  dp . 
The bilineur for111 on the r.h.s. can Le seer1 as a h i s  for the 
macroscopic (phenomenological1 description of the system (Lesse, 1982) .  
The layer the S the less infona&tior~ is irhererlt ir~ the correspor~ding 
ESR . 
2.5 VerificaLion of ESR 
In the for.egoing sectiori it uus showrl that ESR car1 provide sorlle 
information &out the behaviour of the system even under conditions 
which make the use or' other. 111ucie1l irg ~r~ethods ia~pr-act icttll e . fur. 
example, when the state of the system at presenlr is unknown. li~uever, 
h r-. 
the  quest ion rernairs how t h i s  information, e.g. t h e  va lues  <p, <p 
" T p > provided by ( 2.11 1, (2.13 1, could be v e r i f i e d  by U I ~  d a t a  or. 
observations.  
Let us ussulle t h a t  t h e r e  uxt! sollle quar t t i t i e s  deprrtdirlg or1 t h e  sLaCe of 
the  socio-economic system whose values can be observed. Referring t o  
t h e  exairple 2 . 4  one such quarl l i ty curl Le ' t h e  p r i c e  of u starldulrd h s k e t  
of goods' def ined by n = X qi  p i ,  utler-e qi is an ar.bitr.ar.ily detrr.lnirled 
I 
quarltity of cottrittudity i w t ~ i c l ~  fornls a ~ 1 . t  of t h e  Lwsket. The 
equilibrium p r i c e  s* being knoun, it is poss ib le  t o  c a l c u l a t e  
n - C q i  p: = nA,  i. e .  t h e  d i f  fer.erlce betueerl t h e  p r i c e  of a s t a r d a d  
i 
basket a t  a yiveri t ime urtd t h a t  a t  e q u i 1 i l r . i ~ ~ .  Repeated obser~valioris 
of nA car1 Lr corlsider-ed as a s t o c h a s t i c  process nA( t 1, i .  e .  u s  d faillily 
of random v a r i a b l e s  n ir~dexed by t. The index t is t o  be i r~terpr .e ted  A 
as Ule tin~e uhert Gie utrservuCiurl was rrlade. 
Let us  introduce a feu  a u x i l i c y  d e f i n i t i o n s  
Def in i t ion  2.2: The functiorl R ( X )  defined by 
is c a l l e d  covariance of t h e  s t o c h a s t i c  process n A ( t ) .  
The s i g n  < > deno tes ,  as before ,  t h e  expected value ( c .  f  . ( 11 1 1. We 
s h a l l  uccnsior~al ly  refer .  t o  t h i s  expected value a s  t o  t h e  enserrtble 
average. 
- 
Definition 2 . 3 :  The random var iab le  n (Ti  Liriiried by a ( T I  = IT n ( t )  i:, T > A n 7.t L 
is ca l l ed  the time average of the s tochas t i c  process n A ( t l .  T is tile 
averag i nq time . 
The irlLeyr.als of s t u c t ~ s s t i c  yruceuses e r e  t o  be urrder~sloud a s  limits i r l  
the  mean here.  
Def irlitiurr 2 . 4 :  A s lochas t ic  pr-ucess IL ( t 1  .%tisfyirlq A 
is ca l l ed  sLr.orlgly erqodic i r ~  t he  near]. 
Now ve can s t a t e  the following proposition: 
* 
If  a s tochas t ic  process n A ( t I  is strurlgly r ryudic  in the  mean then i (TI = <p A 
v i t h  probabi l i ty  1 ,  
and 
The pr-ouf uf Prupouiliun 2.1 is eler~~errLacy arid curl be fou~ld i r l  t e x t h o k s  
on s tochas t ic  processes, e.g.  Helsa e t  a l .  (19731. 
T!ie asserliurr corrtairred i r ~  tire pr-opositiurr is uor~llr exa~nirllrrq i i :  det i l i l .  
A 
The most important outcome is the connection between the estimate <p> 
provided by ESR (cf. (2.111) and the observed values xA(t). Accurdirlg 
to (i1, (ii1 the estimates <p are unbiased estimators of the time 
averages of observed values IL (tl. This tlrukes it possible to ver.ify the 
validity of ESR in any given case. 
The pr.enlise of the p~~uposi L on r.equir.es t11at the observed quarlii ii es 
should behave as a strongly erqodic process. Using the Definition 2.4 
it is possible to ir~Le~.pr.et this ~.equir.en~erit n practical terms as a 
prohibition to use ESR for predicting the values of those system's 
ct~aracteristics whose a~easuraruer~ts 'do rioi f orqei p s t  history' . This 
is a sensible limitation: If we are interested in those properties of 
the system which are determined by history and this deperldence or1 
history does not fade away with passing time then the knowledge of the 
initial state of the systerl~ is an esser~Lial desider.atum and ESR is 
clearly inadequate. On the other hand, if the behaviour of the system 
can be described for a giver1 purpose iri ten~~s of quarltities which 
ultimately become independent of the past, the equilibrium 
represerlLatior~ can be useful . 
It. is perhaps nuL rlecessuy to r.e~nark that while the use of ESR has beer1 
demonstrated using the Example on a particularly simple (linear1 system, 
the srethod is applicaLle to dyrlmric systents of corisiderably uider 
generality. The following section should justify this essertion. 
3. SOHE OTHER DYNAMIC SYSTEMS AND THEIR EQUILIBRIUH STATiSTICAL 
REPRESENTAT IONS, 
3.1 Differential games 
A feu results fro111 tile field or' uptirrlunt currtr-01 and differ-erltial gmlles 
are needed. The standard monographs such as Isaacs (19651, Friedman 
i 1971 1, 1r1lr.i ligatur ( 1971 1 should be currsulted for. illore detailed 
information. Hure advanced reviews include Varaiya ( 1971 1 and Gupta 
(1981). 
Let there Le a set of differ.errtia1 eqwtiurrs 
K 
with initial considerations x ( 0 )  = xo: with the  state vector x E R and 
control vectors ul(t>,u2(t>, ..., uN(t) being nleasur-able functiurls of time 
with values ul E Q1, u2 E Q2,. . . , uN E PN where the corltr-01 sets Qk 
(k=l,...,N) are cornwct subsets of some Euclidean space with appropriate 
dinlensions. The furictiurls f ( are ussumed to satisfy the standard 
conditions of integratility for any uk c: Qk. 
Further, let there be a list uf N functions hk(xl,ul, ..., u ,t> N 
continuous in all argunrents in the sets defined Bbove and another list 
of functiorlv uk(tf,x(tf)) which m e  Lourlded fur- tf,x(tf) from a closed 
terminal set F: CO ,TI X R ~ .  The cost functiorl of the i-th player 
The equations (3.11, (3.21 together with a criterion of optimality 
def ir~e a diEEererlLia1 game. 
If Ltie equaLior~s (3.11, (3.2) do rlut deyerrd ur~ Ci111e xplicitly the qunle 
is called autunun~ous .
The rnost frequenlly 111et cr.iCer.ia UE upti~l~ality are 
(a )  Pureto optimality 
(b1 security pay off 
( c )  ~ d s h  equilibrium 
v 
The Paretu optimal strategies Xk satisfy J k (1: 1"" u N 1 5 Jk (ul, ... 
v Uk E Qk k-1, ... N' 
The Pawto optinla1 sir-ategies cor-L-esporld to a situatior~ when all 
participants cooperate to achieve a minimum cost solution. 
The security pay off strategies ck satisfy 
~hese strategies minimize the damage to the k-th player caused by a 
concerCed actior~ uf the rest uf the players. 
n 
Nash equilibrium strategies u w e  defirled Ly k 
The.Nash e q u i l i b r i u m  s t r a t e g i e s  characker ize  a s t a t e  which is stahit! I n  
t h e  sense  t h a t  arty player.  d e v i a t i r  ~g froet t h e  equi  1 ilr-iunt s t r a t e g y  is 
penal ized  by a n  inc reesed  c o s t .  
The s o l u t i o r ~ s  of t h e s e  garrles cart Le o b t a i r ~ e d  i r i  t h e  f o l l o u i r ~ g  uay: 
A d i f f e r e n t i a l  game optimal  i n  t h e  Pa re to  s e n s e  can be reduced t o  
s o l v i r ~ q  a s i ~ r l p l e  rfyrlwaic opti~ttizaliclrt  prublen~ w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
A s e c u r i t y  pay of f  d i f f e r t r l t i a l  game car1 Le su lved  as a set of N ze ro  
sum games each  played by a s i n g l e  p l aye r  a g a i n s t  a n  aggregate  opponent 
f  or-rrted by a l l  t h e  L-entairting p r l i c i p a r ~ l s  . 
Nash equ i l ib r ium s o l u t i o n  can be obta ined  by us ing  t h e  f o l l o u i n g  theorem 
(Friedman, 1.971 : 
Theorem 3.1. 
I f  t h e  furictiorts f (  1, gk( 1, hk( 1 a r e  c o r ~ t i r ~ u o u s l y  d i f  f e r - e r ~ t i t h l e  i r r  
a l l  t h e i r  arquments and i f  t h e  equi l ibr ium s t r a t e g i e s  "k a r e  L ipch i t z  
continuous then  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a vec to r  valued func t ion  Wk(t ,xl  s a t i s fy i r rg  
K on the b o u d e y  of t h e  terminal  s e t  Wk=yk, arid i n  t h e  set C0,TJ x R x 
Q1 x . . . QN tr1e equatioris 
The funct ion  f  ( x ,  t ,  ul ,  ... uN) pk + hk ( x , u l  ... u t) = Hk ( x ,  L .  pk, ui ... uN) T I  ' 
is c a l l e d  the haniiltonian of the k-th p layer .  
a wk The new v a r i a b l e s  pk - ax 
a r e  the  shadow p r i c e s  cor.r.espor~dirlg Lo Lht! s t a t e  v c i a b l e s  x a r ~ d  
assoc ia ted  u i t h  the  k-th p laye r .  
D i  f  fereriLia1 geulles are a rraLur-a1 gerier.alizalion of Lhe optirnuru qr.owl11 
models (e .g .  I n t r i l i g a t o r ,  1971: I sa rd  e t  a l . ,  1979) and hence t h e i r  ESH 
can be of corisideral le  pr.acLica1 inter.esL. 
The funct ions  Wk car1 Le r -e la led  Lo Lyapunov furioLiorls: 
Theoren1 3.2 ( S t a l f  o rd ,  L e i  Llaarr, ~ k o u r o r ~ s k i  1 
Consider a tuo person zero  sum game, i . e .  N=2 with p laye r .no .1  
lainimizirrg, and p laye r  rlo.2 ~naximizirlg J. Let the1.e be a coritinuously 
d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  Lyapunov func t ion  
V ( x , t >  : 0 + R u i t h  t h e  f o l l o u i r ~ g  p roper t i e s :  
f o r  a l l  u2 c Q2, x ~ 0 ,  C h 0 
* * 
where ul E Pi, u2 r Q 2 ,  and a ( 1 1  x I I ) ,  b ( I i  x 1 1 )  er r  poaiLivr ,  
conLinuous and increasing func t ions .  
* " * " 
If the conditions a), b1 and c1 are satisfied then ul -  ul, u2 = u, 
i .e. 
Proof is ezsy and follows the ideas of Stalford and Leitman (19711, and 
Skowr.orlski (1977). A generalizatiur~ to N-persor~ differential games is 
available (Stalford and Leitman, 19731. 
We observe that accurdirtg to 11 arld c) 
The following proposition follows immediately from (3.41 and from Remark 
Proposition 3.1 
Let there be a functiort V(x,t> satisfyirtg the corditions. of Theorem 3.1 
* * 
and let h(x,t,ul,u2) 1 0, x E 0, t b 0. Then the optimal trajectories 
of the differential system (3.1 1 are bundd. 
3.2 Equilibrium statistical representation of some games 
The ESR correspollding to a set of autorio~~~ous dif f er3ential equations v i  th 
bounded trajectories has been introduced in Section ?. Proposition 3.1 
makes it possible to treat certairl differential games in the same way. 
Definition 3.1 
The equililriurrl statistical r-epr-eser~taLi;~r~ of suciu-ecorlu~ttic systen~ 
whose uynwnlcs 1s described by an autonomous optimurn growth model or by 
e11 autor~oi~luus tuu pe1.sor1 zero SUIII yante arid which s a L i s f i e s  P:.~posltior~ 
3.1 is given by the following equations 
P(x> = exp CQ - X V(x)l 
max V(x) = H 
XEO 
1riterpr.etat ior I 
a) Lyapunov function 
The ir~terpretaLiori of Lyapurlov furlctiot~ in the cor~Lext of differ.entia1 
games is of special interest. 
We observe that the solution of the equatiorl (3.4 1 cor.r.espordirlg to an 
autononious system in general has the form V(x,t> = Et + V(x>, where E is 
an arbitrury coristar~t whose magnitude does riot change the character of 
the dynamic equations. The function V(x1 thus coincides uith V(x,t> 
either if E-0, or if t=O, and hence V(x,t> and V(x1 can be identified by 
an appropriate choice of the time scale. The function ~ ( x ,  t l  is to be ' 
interpreted as the present value of cost corresponding to the initial 
state, and accrued along the optimum path: 
* * 
V(x,t) = ff h(x.t,u1,uZ) dt; 
* * 
we observe that $ - h(x,t,u ,u 1 ir~ aqreenlerit uith (3.4) 1 2  
The Lyapunov function V(x1 is then the present value of rninimum/optimum 
cost ( i . e .  of the cuvt  accurl~u~ated alorlg the opti~~~un~ wthl evaluaLed et 
t = O .  
b) Probability distribution 
It can be seer1 that the ESR given by Definition 3.1 assigns highest 
prokbility to the path with minimum cost. This is certainly reasonable 
from the commorl serlse point of view and perhaps it can be interpreted es 
cost effiency in the Smith (1978) sense. This cost efficiency is 
contingent upon the r~or~r~egativi ty of the Lagrarqe mu1 tiplier 1. 
However, Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the minimization of real- 
valued convex furlctiunals or1 corlvex subsets subject to inequality 
constraints G(x1 & 0 are nonneqative provided that G(x) is cqnvex (e.g. 
Luenberqer, 1969, p.213ff). These requir-ements are not difficult to 
satisfy as the negative entropy functional is convex and the condition 
a) in Theor-ern 3.2 rnukes V(x,t) bounded by tuo convex functions a( l 1 x 
3.3 An Example 
Let there be a large number- of finns each attempting to follow a planned 
pth. For simplicity I shall assume that the planned growth of the i-th 
firm can be described in terms of a single economic irdicator qi(t>. 
The ectual growth is given by fi(t). 
y t > -  qi(t) 
The growth fluctuation is xi(t) = 
. Vi(t1 
The fluctuations have a dynamics 
uilere u is C11e cur1Lru1 variable t,vailaLie tu tile f irxl fur st&ili;~aCion i 
uf  f iuctuetiotls, arld w i  is tile 1u111ped effect uf exugerluus ciest&ilizlr~g 
- 
fac tors .  Assuming t h z t  the  devia t ions  f ~ u n  the planned p ~ t h  are  small 
ue curl lir~eerrize and ob ta in  
w11er.e the  coefficierlCs a ,  b  a1.e assuc~ed t o  be iderl t ical  f o r  a l l  f i r m s .  
The cost  of s t a b i l i z a t i o n  is assumed t o  be 
2 
where t f ,  q ,  r, s > 0, r < s b . The finn seeks a pulicy ui ~nir~imizirlg 
the cost  i r respect ive  of the  influence of the  exogenous f ac to r s ,  The 
proble111 car1 be Created a s  a zero sum game played by t he  f inn  agairlst 
nature. 
The huniltonian is 
The optinlunl cor~Crols a r e  
The optimum hmi l t on i an  becomes 
To ob ta in  the opt imal  paLh we s h a l l  not  r'oliou t h e  usual procedure of 
solvlrlg the ccrlurllct; equtl l iur~s,  i r ~ s l e d ,  ue  sha l i  seek the  Lyapu:~uv 
function in the f o ~ n  
The equatiui~ (3.4 1 is rlou 
which can be solved fur K. 
The positive r.uut is 
We observe that 
and hence V qualifies as Lyapunov function 
The vpti~llun~ str.ateqies 
y i e l d  t h e  dyr~amics 
with t r a j e c t o r i e s  
X - x  i i o exp - E t )  
where xio are Ulr i r ~ i t i a l  f l uc tua t i o r~s .  
If tile ri~u~her. of f i n ~ ~ s  is very la rye  the cos t  of col lect i r lg  the  da ta  uri. 
x .  may be excessive.  Therefore, urlless we use ESR. t h e  orlly yr.actica1 
10 
cu r~c lu s io r~s  we car1 draw fr.os~ (3.10 1 ar.e 
( i 1  the f l uc tua t i ons  tend t o  zero,  
lr12 ( i i 1  t h e  half t ime of s tab i l i zak ion  is t = - 
IF 
(ha l f t ime  of s t a b i l i z a t i o n  is a time required f o r  reducing the i n i t i a l  
f luctuatiuri  t o  half  of its s i z e ) ,  arld her~co a f t e r .  about 10. t1/2 the  
syste111 w i l l  be p r a c t i c a l l y  s t ab i l i z ed .  
To dernor~strnte t h e  cor~riectior~ between dyriamics arid ESR we s h a l l  con side^. 
b e  i n i t i a l  f luc tua t ions  as random and equation (3.101 as defining a 
s tochus t i c  process 
x ( t )  = x exp ( -  l i t )  
o (3.11) 
where xo is a r-aldon~ v u i a l l e  uriiformly d i s t r i b u t e d  i r ~  sorne in te rva l  4. 
I t  is possible  t u  s11ou t h a t  U ~ i u  pr.ocess is str .oryly eryudic in  the  mearl 
i n  the sense of Definit ion 2 . 4 .  Proposition 2.1 ind ica tes  t h a t  fo r  such 
a process t he  tillle averacje of x ( t )  ( c f .  D e f i r ~ i t i o r ~  2.31 equals the  
etlsemble average <x> with p r -ohb i l  i t y  one. Therefore, the  rxpec ted 
value uE x cur-rtrspor~diry t o  a l l  possible r . ~ ~ l i s r ; ? i u ~ ~ s  of t11e s y s t e ~ ~ ~  
ir-respeclive uf  i n i t i a l  cundi t ions  is a n  unbiased evti~i~eitor of the time 
average. T11e erlseolbit! avt?r.aqt! car1 be uLLtiirled, a s  i l l  S r c t i o r ~  2 ,  usirlg 
the p r o h b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
P(x) = exp C Q  - X V(x) l ,  
1 2 
where V(x> = - K x , 2 
X 2 I exp CQ - 2 K x23 $ K x dx I n 
X E Q  
The exauple should i l l u s t r a t e  b e  follvuing puints:  
111 larye systenlv t he  vtir iabies [nay be aggregaCed by corlsiderirlq thein cs 
s tochas t ic  processes. For example, the  equations (3.10) have been 
replaced by the equaCiori (3.11).  The time averaqeu of these  processes 
sometimes ( c f .  Propasi t ion 2.1) can be replaced by ensemble aver-ages, 
i . e.  by aver-ages taken over- a l l  possible  r-ealisat  ions of the  systen~. 
The corresponding probability d i s t r i bu t ion  is obtained from the 
essttrit ial features  of the  ~r~icrodyr~anics  as r-epreuer~ted by Lyapunov 
functions,  and frvm some pre-estimates of the system's behaviour (H, a ) .  
The Lyapunov furlctiorl is irl terpreted as the  r n i r ~ i ~ n u r r ~  o r optimum cost .  
The cost  minimizing nicrodynurnics thus forms a natural  basis fo r  the 
descr.iptive s taLis t ica1  reyr eser ~ l a t i u r l .  
4 .  Discussion 
T11e patierrt r.eader u i  11 llave p a l  ized tllat tile urrder.lyinq tIle!lle uf ti~is 
paper is simple t o  the  point  of t r i v i a l i t y :  Take a s e t  of dyriamic 
equatiur~s,  exCr.act utiatever. i r ~ f  ur~rlatior~ on the belraviour. of the  solutiorr 
can Le obLained from the s t ruc tu re  of the equations, and use i t  f u r  
e s t i ~ l ~ a t i r y  the  p ~ . u M i l i t y  t h a t  Che r~eiyhbourllood of a .po i r~C i r r  a 
sui tably  defined space is a part  of some t ra jec tory .  If the infor.~~i+tion 
d e s c r . i l i ~ y  the systenl 's Lehaviour- is ti111e irrdeper d e n t ,  tile p r u h b i l  i t y  
diskribution is statioriar-y and the corresponding ~ L a t i s t i c a l  model 
cor.r.esporrds t o  equi 1 ilr.iult.  
This recipe irraktts it rreceusar-y t o  use certairr irrgr.edier rts: the  
Lehaviour uf a dynamic system is qua l i t a t i ve ly  analyzed in  ternis of 
Lyapuriov furlctiorrs. The p r . o l a l i l i t y  estimatiorl procedure rllust be 
suf f ic ien t ly  general to  adn i t  Lyapunov functions preferably without any 
fur-ther. ad hoc currsider.ations. This points t o  t he  Pririciple of Haxin~unl 
Entr-opy . Indeed, t he  fea ture  of entropy maximization which is sometimes 
c r i t i c i z e d  as its weakriess, riarnely , its lack of behavioural rneanirly , is 
turned here in to  a s t rength :  the  behavioural cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of the 
s t a t i s t i c a l  nldel a r e  supplied by the  persori f urraulatiriq the  behaviuua l  
microdynamics, not by the s t a t i s t i c i a n .  
The flavuur of the  pr.ducC is, of course, t u  a l a y e  deyr.ee deCermirred 
by the ingredients. However, the  formal mathematical considerations 
yuidirrq the corrstructiorl uf the  theory lead t o  r e s u l t s  with an 
interes t ing economic in te rpre ta t ion .  This u e s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the 
example i r ~  Sectiorr 3 . 3 ,  ut1er.e a pr .ula l i l i  t y  distr.iluCion wcs der.ived 
which 3epended on Lile cust; function i n  2 sensible  111cnne~-. Of cou-se,  
t h i s  is due Lu t11e fi=cC L i l b t  S D ~ I I ~  L Y ~ ~ ~ U T I U V  f u r ~ c t i u ~ ! ~  lmve L . ~ ~ S L J ~ I G L ~ &  
ecur~umic in te rp re taLions ,  e . g .  a s  valuat iorl  f u r ~ c t i u n s ,  c o s t  func t ions ,  
e t c .  As a corlsequellce, t h e  cosC furlcCion, or., i n  a cornp1emer1Ler.y 
funnula t ion ,  u t i l i t y ,  e n t e r s  t h e  p r o h b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  n e i t h e r  by 
devigr~ rlor by acciderlt  : it is t11er.e by 111atlie11wLica1 r~ectsssi t y  , because 
i t  is an e n t i t y  de f in ing  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  optimal t r a j e c t o r i e s  a t  
t h e  nlicr-o l e v e l .  
We have seen t h a t  t h e  Lyapurlov fulictioris ussucia ted  w i U ~  t11e dyrlanics 
lead t o  reasonable r e s u l t s .  Houever, it niay be t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  sume 
o Lher. char.acter.ist  ics which car1 a l s o  be used f o r  e s t in~a t i r lg  
p r o h b i l i t i e s .  In t h i s  con tex t  i t  is i ~ i s t r u c t i v e  t o  explore  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e l a x i r y  t h e  r equ i r . e~~~er l t  t h a t  ESR s l ~ o u l d  Le based or1 
Lyapunov funct ions  and r e p l a c e  t h e  c o s t  funct ion  by the  t o t a l  u t i l i C y  
flow/tuCal e x p r d i t u . e  f low, i . e .  by t h e  huni l tur i ia r~  ( c f .  equat ion  
(3 .31) .  This  p o s s i b i l i t y  is r a t h e r  seduc t ive  f o r  seve ra l  reasons: 
F i r s t l y ,  t h e  hunilturiiari ( o r  t h e  Cotal experlditure f i u u )  H u l l l f i e s  h L h  
aspec t s  of the  optimizat ion process  i . e .  t he  optimum a l l o c a t i o n  of the  
s t a t e  vector  x and t h e  opCimurn valuat iori  as represented  by t h e  shadow 
p r i c e s  p. A s  a  consequence, it is an important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the  
dyriumics. "We firld t h e  geo~neCry of t h e  h m i l t o r i i a n  f u r ~ c t i o n  t o  be t h e  
fundamer~tal determinant of t h e  long-run behaviour of a  competi t ive 
dyrlamical sy~tern"  (Cass a rd  S h e l l ,  1976).  The sulut iori  or' PareCo 
optimal games, of two person zero  sum games a d ,  by impl ica t ion ,  t h e  
s e c u r i t y  pay-off s o l u t i o r ~ s  of N-persor~ g m e s  can a l l  be obiairled (urder. 
c e r t a i n  p laus ib le  assunpt ions)  by so lv ing  canonical  equat ions  
motion, 
a H  
arid, us ing  4 . 1 ,  i f  += 0 t hen  
As a corlssquerlce, & pr~uLaLiliCy distriLuCior1 P ( x , p l  = exp C Q  - X H i x , p ) l  
de f ined  ove r  t h e  phase space  Cx,pl , with X determined by 
1 1 P(x ,p )  H(x,p)  dxdp - corlst. appear.s Cu l~lake ser lsr .  Irideed, Chis 
is Che type  of p r . u l a l i l i t y  disCr.iluCiurl which one r~leets  i n  sCat i sCica1  
mechanics. 
However., U1er.e is a r i  inrpor-tant d i f  f e r m c e  betweer1 phys ics  arid economics. 
The phys ica l  hami l tonians  can  be p p s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e  wherees t h e  economic 
ones a r e  i n  g e n e r a l  i r d e f i r l i t e  (Samuelson, 1972: Rockafe l l a r ,  1973: 
Cass and S h e l l ,  1976). General ly speaking t h i s  is due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  phys ica l  analogy of stiadow p r i c e s  ( lineac- erornentu~l) is brought i n t o  
the  mechanical hamil tonian v i a  a p o s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e  q u a d r a t i c  form 
( k i n e t i c  &le~-gy 1 . Irl contrasC t h e  dependence of t h e  (optirnura ) economic 
h a n i l t o n i a n  on shadow p r i c e s  is t h e  r e s u l t  of i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  
dynamic consCrainCs arld opCirnal p o l i c i e s .  This  illearis Chat Ct~e sinlplesC 
q u a d r a t i c  hami l tonian  i n  phys ics  h a s  t h e  form H 2 (x2  + p 1 and phys 2 
op t  ; 1 (,2 - ). i n  economics Hec 2 A s a c u r i s r q u r r ~ c r  Che i r l t q r h l  I exp (Q - X H(x,p)  H(x ,p)  dxdp curlvelyrs i r ~  phys ics  LuC r1uC 
r iecessari  1 y i r i  ecul l o ~ ~ ~ i c s .  1 C appeor.s Cili~C tile ~ I ~ J I I ~  i tu r l i a~  I is use fu l  fur 
p r - o u i l i t y  estintation only so lung a s  i t  rekains the Lyapunov property 
arld herlce i L s  use i r ~  art ecorlol~tic ~LaLisCicul theor-y is of 1i111iLed value. 
The construction of ESR f o r  a given dynamic system thus  depends on us 
firldirtg a suiCuble Lyapurlov furlction. Accordir~g t o  Rer~~ark 2 . 2  f o r  (1 
l i nea r  dynamic system the existence of a Lyapunov function is equivelent 
t o  clsye~ptuLic sCaLi 1 i t y  . TIleref o r e ,  ar1 ESR of an autor~ur~~ous l i n e a r  
asy~nptot ical ly  s t a b l e  dynanic system always e x i s t s .  Can we make a 
si~ailu. stateruerlt f u r  a elor-e qerler-a1 dyr~iil~~ic systetl~? 
The answer is provided by the Converse Theorems on S t a b i l i t y  and 
Bour~ciedr~ess (Yoshizawa, 1975 1. Br.oadly syeakirtg the  existerlce of a 
Lyapuriov furlction is guaranteed i f  the dynamic system is loca l ly  
Lipst~iCziarl and i f  it is urrifor,mly asyrllptoCically stable. 
We thus a r r i v e  a t  a conclusion: 
Ariy [tludel of a socio-ecor~omic syster~i (ordir~ix-y dyr~ar~iic reodel, welfare 
optimizing model, d i f f e r e n t i a l  game model, e t c . )  whose dynamic equations 
a r e  autonunuus, l oca l l y  Lipsh i t t i an ,  and which is uriifonnly 
asymptotically s t a b l e  has an equilibrium s t a t i s t i c a l  representation.  
5 . CONCLUSIONS 
The equi 1 i lr . iua s ta t i sCica1  r.epr.esentaCion of a d y r ~ a ~ ~ ~ i c  systen~ ( ESR 1 is 
the  probabil i ty d i s t r i b u t i o n  which maximizes entropy subject  t o  an upper 
Lourid ur1 Lyapur IUV function associated w i  t h  art autorio~~iuus dynatlaic sysCe111. 
ESR h a s  the folluui.rlg proper t ies .  
1. ESR is i r ~ t e r p r e t e d  es p r o b b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  neighbour-hood of a given  
pair l t  i r~  t h e  state ( c o n f i g u r . a t i o r ~ )  s p c e  Le lo rqs  t o  some t r . a j ec to ry  
of t h e  dynamic system. 
. 2  The time averaqe  o f  arl a r l i t r - m y  observa t ior l  r ~ ~ a d e  or1 a dyncunic 
systern can be t r e a t e d  es a s t o c h e s t i c  p rocess .  I f  t h i s  p roces s  is 
str.orlgly eryt idic  i n  t h e  rilean, i . e .  vaguely speakirlg i f  t h e  systerll 
f u r g e t s  iLs pst, then t h e  ESR produces an expected va lue  of t h e  
obse rva t  i o r ~  which is ar I u r h i a s e d  e s t i r ~ ~ a t o r  f t h e  Lime average .  
3 .  I f  t he  dynamic system is g e n e r a t e d  by a dynamic op t imiza t ion  111ode1 
or. a zer-o suu qwae a q a i r ~ s t  r~a tur .e ,  t h e  Lyapurtov fur lc t ion i i f  it 
e x i s t s )  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  p r e s e n t  c o s t / u t i l i t y .  The r e s u l t i n g  
ESR Chert s a t i s f i e s  t h e  c r . i t e r i o r i  of c o s t  e f f i c i e r i cy  postu1at;ed by 
Smith. The ESR p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  t h u s  b r i d g e s  t h e  gap  
betweert behaviuural .  arid desc r ipCive  rnudels. 
The e x i s t e n c e  of a Lyapunov f u n c t i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  a dynamic system 
i m p l i e s  t h a t  Uie system is s t a b l e  a r ~ d  kur lded .  The Lyapur~ov furictiori  
c e r t a i n l y  e x i s t s  i f  the dynamic e q u a t i o n s  s a t i s f y  t h e  Converse Theorems 
of S t a b i l i t y  (Yoshizaua, 1975) i . e .  i f  the s o l u t i o r i s  are uniformly 
a sympta t i ca l l y  stable and t h e  dynamic e q u a t i o n s  l o c a l l y  L i p s h i t z i a n .  
I t  f o l l ows  t h a t  t h e  ~nicr.odynamic equa t ior l s  I I I U S ~  have s o l u t i o n s  which a r e  
a t  least s k a b l e  ( o r  b o u d e d )  i f  t h e  equi l ib r i l lm s t a t i s t i c a l  
r e p r e s e ~ l t a t i o r l  should exis t ; .  Conver.sely, i f  u sacio-economic system h a s  
a meaningful ESR, t h e  s t a b i l i t y / b o u n d e d n e s s  of t h e  microdynmic 
s o l u t i o n s  is i n ~ p l i e d .  A s  a cor~sequericr , t h e  t heo ry  e s t a b l i s h e s  a l i n k  
between t h e  ex i s t ence  of a iniacro-1 equ i l i b r ium d e s c r i p t i o n  and 
s L a l i l i t y / h u r ~ d e d l ~ e s s  a t  t h e  111icr.o l e v e l .  
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